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Introduction 
So-called donkey -sentences like the one in (I) raise many important issues for the 
syntax and semantics of natural language quantification. 
(I) If a farmer owns a donkey. he often beats it. 
The most influential account of donkey sentences was pioneered by David Lewis 
( I 975), Hans Kamp ( l 981 ). and Irene Heim ( I 982 ). Its main ingredients are: (i) 
Indefinites are not existential quantifiers as traditional logic maintained; instead 
they are interpreted as restricted free variables. (ii) These variables can be bound 
by an "adverb of quantification" (Lewis' term). such as (iften in (I); these adverbs 
are unselective binders which can bind all free variables in their scope. (iii) The 
donkey pronouns are also bound by this unselective binder. (iv) if-clauses in 
general serve to supply the domain of such unselective quantifiers. 
Our example donkey-sentence (I) will then receive the logical form and the 
paraphrase in (2). 
(2) a. Oftenx.y la farmertx) "a donkey (y)" x owns yl Ix beats yl 
b. 	 ''Many pairs x,y such that xis a farmer, y is a donkey, and x owns 
y are such that x beats y". 
The literature on adverbial quantification is plentiful and the Lewis-Kamp-
Heim account is by no means the last word. The architect of a theory of adverbial 
quantification has many important decisions to make. Very roughly and recklessly 
put, at each choice point the theory could go towards more syntax or more 
semantics/pragmatics. Let me sketch four issues that have been focal points of the 
theoretical debates. (i) What kind of things are quantified over? Following Lewis 
( 1975), many researchers assume that adverbial quantifiers quantify over tuples of 
restricted variables. The alternative, initially more intuitive, is to assume 
quantification over something like situations (events, times. states of affairs, 
circumstances, conditions. whatever). (ii) What is the nature of indefinite noun 
phrases? In the Lewis-Kamp-Heim approach they serve to introduce and restrict 
*The ti tic chosen here differs from the much less appropriate title or 1he abstracl submitted to 
SALT II ("Conditional Reslrictnrs and (Un)Selective Bindinf'). This paper is a preliminary report 
on ongoing research which 1s sUpJX>scd to culminate in a significanl parl of my dissertation. Some 
or this material was prcscn1ed in an earlier form at ween. XI (Hm Fintcl 199:?). A much belier 
paper would have resulted if I had had more time to take into account the arguments and prnJX,sals 
of Manfred Krifka 's SALT II paper ( Krifka 199'.!). which cm-crs some of the same ground a~ mine. 
While engaged in this research. l ha,c enjoyed the inestimable help of Barbani Partee, Angelika 
Kratzer, V eena DwiYc<li, lfotJ.c Rullmann, P.,rnl Portner, an<l Sue Tunstall. All mistakes arc mine. 
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free variables. A situation-based approach may be compatible with the more 
conservative view that they are existential quantifiers. (iii) What is the nature of 
donkey pronouns? In the Lewis-Kamp-Heim approach they arc bound variable 
pronouns dependent on the unselective quantifier. A situntion-based approach 
would have to tnke recourse to the E-type account which treats donkey pronouns 
as disguised definite descriptions. (iv) How is the domain ol the ad\erbial 
quantifier determined? This question doesn't really arise with nominal quantifiers 
whose common noun directly gives the appropriate domain. With adverbial 
quantifiers we have what. following Diesing ( 1990) and Krifka ( I 992). could be 
called the problem of "semantic partition". There is more to be said here than the 
usual assumption that i(clauses are designated devices for restricting quantifiers. 
Things arc more complicated: material from the matrix clause can be quantified 
over. and not all the material in an if-clause has to be quantified over (this is 
known as the "'proportion problem"). Researchers have attcmpti:d to get at the 
roots of semantic partition from different nnglc~. There arc syntax-based 
proposals, especially the theory of Molly Diesing ( l 990) and Angelika Kratzer 
( l 989a). There are pragmatics based proposals: for ei\ample, Herman ( 1987) 
seems to go in this direction. And there are focus,based proposals (Rooth 1985. 
1989, Krifka 1992, von Fintel 1992a). 
At this point. we need new considerations and new data to evaluate the 
performance of the various theories. What kind of new data might there be'? 
Henriette de Swart ( 1992) and Cleo Condoravdi ( 1992) both discuss types or uses 
of noun phrases that had not been considered before in the donkey literature. The 
avenue that I am exploring in current research is to investigate other adverbial 
clause-types beyond the usual if/when-clauses and their interaction with 
quantification. I 
In this paper, I will present and analyte data conreming the availability of 
donl,.ey-anaphora with indcfinit.es in complex conditionals (11n/e11, <mfr if.. C\'Cfl 
if). Throughout. l will hold certain assumptions constnnt which ! lay out in 
Section I. Roughly, I adopt Heim's ( 1990) ··scmanticky"' situntion-based appronch 
to adverbial quantification t.hat treats indefinites as existential quantifiers and 
take, donkey pronouns to bt· r:-l) pc pronouns. Within this framework. I briefly 
propose a semantics for cornpkx conditionals (Scl"lion 2), and skeld1 :rn account 
of why indefinites in complex conditionals arc generally not availahk for donkey 
anaphora (Sectiun 3). In the central part of the paper. I then investigate the 
respective roles ol focus and syntactic scoping in the derivation of the domain of 
adverbial quantifiers. In Section 4, I show how focus can make indefinites in 
complex conditionals available for donkey-anaphora after all And finally in 
Section 5, I explore the respective bragging rights ol focus and syntactic scoping. 
l L,ccun ( I Q84) and Geis ! I t;I-(:,) :ire the unh rclerrn,-c, Lil.ti I <1m ,rn -ire , ,1 thal h,\\ (: 'lrtiil:ir 
~1mh111un-;. On the\\ hole-, th(·\ dP rnit '>l'Cln l~) L.Jkc rnlo <H:count lhl' lor<d "i('/11<.llllic literature l}tl 
Jd\ rrh1al LJUanttl 1~:..it1nn. · 
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1. The Framework Assumed 
The Lewis-Kamp-Heim account of donkey-sentences sketch.•d in the introduction 
breaks with tradition in many respects: especially with its new type of unselecti\ e 
binding and the unorthodox view of indefinites .1s introducers of free variables 
rather than as existential quantifiers. As mentioned there. a more conservative 
approach v. ould treat the ad, crb as 4uantifyi11g mer one , ariable only: events. 
times. or situations. states of affairs. circumstances. conditions. whatever we want 
to call it.2 Such an account ma1 also rescues the traditional intuition that 
indefinite m111n phrases han· e,istential for,·c. ThP most sophisticated version of 
this line of research is represented by Berman ( 1987) and Heim ( 1990) who 
suggest that adverbs of quantification quantif) 01 er situations. They adopt the 
framework of situation sc!llantics developed by Angelika Kratzer ( 1989b) lo 
handle problems of counlerfactual reasoning.' There situations arc parts of 
possible worlds and propusiti,rns arc reconstructed as \l'ts of situations 
(intuiti\cly. thusi: situations in which the proposition is true). 
Modulo the interpretation of the pronouns and some rl'fincmcnts, this gives 
( 1 ) the logiral form in (3 ). 
(3) a. Oftens Is a farmer 0\1;ns a donkey! Is he beats 1tl 
h. 	 '"Man) situations in which there is a fanucr ,rnd there is a donkey that 
the farmer owns are such that he beats ii." 
Whal can w,, do with th,· pronouns in the matrix clause? The situation-based 
approach takes f\'Coursc lo the theory of pronouns as disguised definite 
descriptions (Cooper l 979. El'ans l 980). Let me be non committal as to any 
specific implementation of the E type approach (for some discussion of the 
choices sec Heim 1990. Neale 1990. and Chierchia 1991 ). The logical form for 
( l J is then amended to (4). 
(4) a. Oflens Is a farmer owns a donkey l ls the farmi:r b~·ats the donkey I 
b. 	 "Many sirnations in which thl'fe is a farmer and there is a donkey that 
the farmer owns are <;uch that the farma brats th,, donk<·y ... 
One laq r11udif1,·ati(>n h,1s to be made. In her dissert;1tion, Heim had argll<'d 
Ycry forceful I) agai n,t the I·: ty pc eunqrnal of donkey pn>nuuns using among 
uthcrs her now famous sage plant example, a cunditional \ersion uf which i, 
given in (.'iJ. 
(5) If someone buys a sage plan! here he usually buys l'ight others with it. 
The probkrn uf cnurse is that there won·t be a u11iq11<~ sage plant that the dcfinill' 
desniptiun hid\kn in the I· type pronuun c,m fclicituusly rdcr tu. The sit11ation 
based acn1unt has an answn to this prohlt·111. Ht·rn1,rn ( 1987) suggested having the 
2An car!~ prupo'-1~d ~tlitn!.~ thc,,t.· !111{'•, \\a•; maJc h;- flH'f Stumpi l'fk\ Jt/8).) 
-">.A.t th1i.., purnt. I \\Ill n,11 a11cmr1 ,m: c'i1tnpd11:-,nn \\llh lhe ··we..,! ( (1,i•,1 .. 1hcnr::, l,I \1tu,-ttlnn 
\,,('I1Llt11l'1..'.'-. (H,U\\!\l.' (\: l\·11~ Jl/1-<J. l'k l 
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adverb quantify solely over the minimal elements in the set of situations supplied 
as its first argument. The quantificational adverb always. for example. will take 
two sets of situations and will demand that all the miminal situations in lhe first 
set arc part of a silualion in the second set. The new paraphrases for the sage plant 
example and for our stock example are given in (6). 
(6) a. "Most of the minimal situations in which someone buys a sage plant 
here are part of a larger situation in \vhich that someone buys eight other 
sage plants with the one in the minimal situation." 
b. "Many of the minimal situations in which there is a fanner and there is a 
donkey that the fanner owns arc arc part of a larger situation in which 
the farmer beats the donkey." 
Since we plan to integrate all sorts of conditionals into the picture, we need 
to be clear about what conditionals are doing in adverbially quantified sentences. 
The conventional wisdom is that ({-clauses provide the domain of quantification. 
they restrict the adverb of quantification. I would like to spell this out in a way 
that can be extended to account for other types of conditionals. 
First, I will assume that adverbs of quantification denolc relations bc1wecn 
sets of situations. That is. adverbs of quantification can be treated as quantifo:rs in 
the tradition of generalized quantifier theory (for detailed discussion the reader is 
referred to Schwarzschild 1988, 1990, and de Swart 1991). For example, alwun 
will denote the subset relation (modified to allow for Berman's minimality trickl. 
The first argument of the quantifier is special. Adopting. a suggestion by 
Mats Rooth ( 1985, 1989. 1991 ). I assume that the first argument of an adverb of 
quantification is a free variable C lhat can be restricted in various ways: explicit!} 
by an ifdausc, or implicitly by an:ommodating presupposed material.4 
The second argument of the adverbial quantifier is supplied by the matrix 
clause minus the adverb. The general schema for the interpretation of adverbial!) 
quantified sentences with a restrictive if-clause is given in (7). Example (I) is now 
analyzed as in (8).5 
(7) 	 ifRQICIIMl=Q[Cr'iRIIMl 0 
Q-many of the minimal situations in C ,1 R arc part of a situation in M. 
,.............. --·-··· ............., ______.............., 
iR: 	 the antecedent proposition used to restrict C ! 
k.;,: 	 the interpretation of the adverb of quantification i 
jC: 	 the set of currently relevant circumstances I 
[M: ..__the _inte11,retation _of the .main clause. minustheadverb. 
4 Assum1ng C to be a ,anablc '"er sets of situations 1,; a s1mphfii:atton. Angelika Kratzer ( J<17X) 
has sho\\ n that the first argument. the com crsational background ,n her !crmm,,logy, is actual!, ol 
a highc1 I~ pc. Non-tri\ ial issue, arc at stake here ,rnJ this is one of lhc most pressing needs 1,,, 
further d,1boration. 
5Annthcr i,suc that l skirt here concerns the question of compnsitionalit} of the treatment m ( 11 ). 
Ohv1ously, the conditional opertaor here magically operates inside the internal structure of 1hc 
c,pression 1! combine_, 11·1th syntactically. 
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(8) a. lif(3x 3y (fanner(x) owns donkey(y))I, 
many !Cl !the farmer beats the donkey!. 
b. 	 ""Many of the minimal situations in the set of currently relevant 
situations in which there is a farmer and there is a donkey and the 
farmer owns the donkey are part of a larger situation in which the 
farmer beats the donkey." 
2. The Semantics of Complex Conditionals 
Next we will have to specify what exact!) the different kinds of complex 
conditionals (unte,s. onfr if: e\'en if) mean. 
2.1 	 linles.1 
What about unleu under this perspective? In numerous textbooks and grammars 
we can find the traditional view that 1.mle.n is equivalent to if ..not. A typical 
example like (9a) is paraphrased by (9b). 
(9) a. I will leave unless Bill calls soon. 
b. 	 I will leave ifBill doesn ·1 call soon. 
Taken together with the semantics for if as marking a restrictive operator on the 
domain of an adverbial quantifier. this would suggest that unles.1 is a subtractive 
or exceptive operator on quantifiers. Something along the lines of ( 10) seems 
called for. The example in (9a) then gets a paraphrase as in ( l l) 
( IOJ unless K Q ICI !Ml::: Q JC - RI !Ml 
(11) ''All of the minimal situations in the set of currently relevant situations 
except the ones in which Bill calls soon are part of a larger situation in 
which I leave." (modulo modality and tense) 
In von Fintel ( 1991) I discussed in some detail the advantages of this approach to 
the meaning of unless. which can be traced back to Geis ( 1973), I argued there not 
only that unle.H is a subtractive operator on quantifier domains, but also that there 
is an additional implicature: the unless-clause states the only exception to the 
quantified proposition. The except-paraphrase employed in ( 11) almost captures 
that ingredient. As far as I can see, this uniqueness implicature does not interact 
with donkey-anaphora, which is why I will ignore this complication here. 
2.2 Focus Adverbs + If 
The guiding principle in our dealings with <mfr if and even ifconditionals will be 
that in them the foeus adverbs only and even have the same meaning that they 
have in cases where they are attached to non-conditional statements. That is we 
should be able to take a semantics for the focus adverbs onlv and even and 
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combine it with a semantics for if-clauses and get as a result a satisfactury 
analysis of on~v ifand even if-conditionals.6 
As far as the semantics of focus is concerned, I will stay fairly informal at 
this point and trust that my suggestions here can he spclkd out in more detail in 
either Rooth"s ( 1985. 1989. 1991) altcrnatiH~ sema11tics or the slructurcd 
propositions approach of Krifka ( 1991, 1992) and others. All we need to assume 
for now is that focussing evokes a set of relevant contrasts to the focussed item. 
There arc relevant contrasts to individuals. to properties, to propositions, etc. The 
sentence JOHN stole 1he hook evokes a set of relevant contrasts to John, 
presumably other possible culprits, The sentence John SWI,\1S evokes a set of 
relevant contrasts to swimming, perhaps other e.xcf<"isc acti\· ities. The sentence 
The Sll,'l'"S shining might evoke a set of relevant co11trasts to the proposit.ion that 
the sun is shining, perhaps other possible weather conditions. I will use the 
following notation: X""a to mean that X is a relevant contrast to the denotation of 
the expression a. For e.xample, X:,,John means that X is a relevant contrast to the 
denotation of John, presumably someone named John. 
2.3 Ont,, +ff= Onl.1· ff 
The semantics I will assume for only is this: it asserts that the focussed item i, the 
only one from the set of relevant contrasts that can be truthfully combined with 
the rest of the sentence. There is in addition an implicature that the sentence 
without only is tme.7 For a sentence like ( 12a) this will gi1e us roughly the 
semantics in (12b). 
( 12) a. John only SWIMS, 
b. VX~wim: X(jl ___,. X:::swim 
lmplicature: John swims. 
That is. ( 12a) will be true iff the only property eomparahle to swimming that 
truthfully applies to John is swimming itself: if John does anything it all. it is only 
swimming. In addition, it is implicated that John does in fact swim. 
What happens when we combine this with our semantics for conditional~'> 
What is the n1caning we get for ( JJ )'! 
(13) Only if you help me will I do the dishes. 
Let us assume for now that what is focussed in ( 13) is the complement of if, that is 
the clause you help me. Whal we get is ( 14).K 
6 1n th1~ I agtce \\ Llh lhc '-1.C'!lllmC'nls c,prcs•;cd b~ L::,l.·an ( 1991) An ,·:1rl: atlcmpt al anal:-11ng ,mfr
¥. int,, 011/r and i/can be h,unJ in i\kCawlcy ( I 97,l) 
This " the standard treatment as argued for by H, ,rn 1. 1969). 
*rhc inner 4uantificr in (OJ J represent; the unil crsJI 4uant1fka11on m c1 si1u,it1ons triggcrcJ by 
the modal will. Note that the semantics proposed here seems to predi..:t that 011/v ifcond1tJ<,n<1i' 
will he uncomfortable with left-monotone increasing adverbial quant1f1cr,. The reason is that 1he~ 
"·ill make it almost imposstble for there ln be a uniquely adequate rcstnctor set I "di lea1c 
Jcta, lcJ d,s.:ussion ,,I this fur a future occasion. 
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<14i VX,._vou help me: t>tcr·x,1 do tht~ disht'sJ-.X -you help me 
lmplicature: If you help me. I will ,h, the di she~. 
What ( 14) says i, that the only cir,·t1mstance in" hirh I will do the dishes is one in 
which you help me. 
2.4 h·,·11 r // h·rn I/ 
The semantics l \\ ill ass time for e,·,.·n is this: it implicates that there is a proper!) 
lrum the set uf rele1a11t cuntra',(s tu the focussed item that 11a, mure like!) tu bt' 
ahle to be truthfully combined with the rest of the sentence than the focussed item 
itself.<> Fnr a Sl'.ntence like ( J5al this "ill g1\\' us the ,ema11tics ill I J:'ihl. 
( 15\ a. John even SWI\!S. 
b. 	 .luhn ,wims.  
lmplicature: 3X~"im: rnim(j) <p X(j\  
Ttwt is, ( J5a1 will be true ill John swims. !'here is an additional irnplicatun: that 
there is a property comparnbie to swimming that wa, more like\:, true of John 
than '" imming itself. 
What happens when we combine thi, with our semantics for conditionals'' 
What is the meaning we get for ( 16'!'1 
( 16) Even if ynu help me I 1, on·t do the dishes. 
Lei us again a~sume that what is foc:u,,ed 1s lhe ..:omplemcnt of if. that is th,• 
clause you help Ille. What we get is ( l 7). 
( l 7) If) ou help me l won· t do the dishes. 
ln1plic1lure: 
3X~~ou help me : no(C('you hdp mt·.l do the dishes) 
< p no{ Cr X.I do tht' dishes) 
The implicature of ( 17) is that there are circumst::rnces other than your helping me 
in which it is even more likel) that I wu11·1 dn the dishes. 
3. Complex Conditionals and Oonktiy-Anaphora 
We now embark ,in our investigation of the interaction of complex conditionals 
and dnnh·y-anaphor,1. Th<' first ,1bser1 at1on is that in grneral the possihilil) of 
donkey-anaphora seems severely limited with complex condirionab. The crucial 
data arc given in ( 18) and ( 19). 
'+-rhc prnpcr ,cmar1ltcs for t'\'i:'n J', in much more d1\plltc lh:u, the (1Jlc tor 011h Snmc nf the 
rdcLrnL rclcrc-ncl'~ arc: I <--1m :-.la)mg al c1 laid: ,upcrfh.·1al k\cl ol an..il):-..b ,1t th1, point anJ 
hcrcb~ apolot!I/C lo the true c.:mno1..,:.cur-i, 
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(18) a. lf a farmer owns a donkey, he often beats it. 
b. { 
*Unless} .
*Even if a farmer owns a donkey, he often beats 1t. 
c. { 
*O~yW }
*lf and only if 
.
a fam1er owns a donkey, does he often beat 1t. 
(19) a. If anyone objects, I will talk to him. 
b. { *Unless } *Even if b" I ·11 lk h.anyone o ~ects, w1 ta to 1m. 
c. { *Only if }*If and only if b. ·11 I lk h.anyone o ~ects. w1 ta to 1m. 
Our theory should not be too successful in deriving the illformedness of donkeys 
with complex conditionals, however. The data in (20) show that if material in the 
conditional other than the indefinite is focussed the indefinite can serve as the 
antecedent for a donkey pronoun in the matrix. 
(20J a. {~~!:srf} a farmer is RICH. he shouldn't beat his donkeys. 
1
b. {~::di~nly if} a farmer is RICH. should he beat his donkeys. 
c. {t!~s~} you {lo~} a donkey. you shouldn't beat it. 
d. {~:':di~nly if} you {lo~} a donkey. should you beat it. 
The challenge for the general theory of donkey-anaphora and for the 
semantics of conditional clauses then is to explain (i) the general unavailability of 
donkey-anaphora in complex conditionals and (ii) the possibility of donkey-
anaphora in special circumstances. In this section, I will lay out why donkey-
anaphora is generally impossible with complex conditionals. In the Section 4. I 
will tum to the cases in (20). 
3.1 Unless 
Why do unless-clauses not allow donkey anaphora? It is important to realize at 
this point that within the framework assumed here the availability of donkey-
anaphora is not a question of syntactic or semantic scope. Instead, the operative 
question is: Is there an appropriate entity in the antecedent .~iruation to refer hack 
ro with a disguised definite description? Consider now the contrast in (21 ). 
(21) a. lf anyone objects, I will talk to him. 
b. *Unless anyone objects, I will talk to him. 
Take (2la). The donkey pronoun him in the main clause is interpreted as an E-
type pronoun, as a disguised definite description, something like the man who 
ohjects or the ohjector. This interpretation meshes successfully with the meaning 
of the rest of the sentence, which as a whole can be paraphrased as "All of the 
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minimal situations in which someone objects are part of a larger situation in 
which I will talk to the objector ... 
The analysis for (2 Ib) with the unle.n-conditional will be something like 
(22). 
(22) a. V(C-{sl 3x (x objects ins)}) (I talk to the objector) 
b. 	 ..All of the minimal situations in the set of currently relevant 
situations except the ones in which someone objects are part of a 
larger situation in which I talk to the objector". 
This is patently nonsensical. In a situation where no one objects there is no 
objector to talk to. More precisely. the E-type pronoun carries an existence 
presupposition: simply that in each of the cases considered there exists an 
objector. The unless-clause on the other hand removes exactly those situations 
where there is an objector from the domain of quantification. The presupposition 
of the E-type pronoun therefore cannot be fulfilled. ( 21 b) then is deviant because 
of a presupposition failure. 
3.2 'Only if 
What is wrong with (21)? 
(21) *Only if someone objects will I talk to him. 
(24) 	 a. \fX=meone objects: '11.ClXJ talk to the objector) 
---...X=someone objects 
b. 	 ..The only type of situation comparable to ones where someone 
objects which is such that in all of those situations I talk to the 
objector are those in which someone objects". 
Of course. (24b) is kind of hard to parse. But a moment of reflection will reveal 
that our sentence (23) asserts as a whole what is already presupposed by one of its 
parts. The E-type prounoun him. interpreted as 'the one who objects'. already 
presupposes that all of the situations under consideration are such that there is an 
objector. Saying that the only situations in which I will talk to the objector are 
such that someone objects in them is dangerously redundant. Is this enough to 
make this as ungrammatical as it is? This is what Robert Stalnaker has to say: 
"The boundaries detennined by presuppositions have two sides. 
One cannot normally assert. command. promise. or even conjecture 
what is inconsistent with what is presupposed. Neither can one 
assert. command. promise or conjecture what is itself presupposed. 
There is no point in expressing a proposition unless it distinguishes 
among the possible worlds which are considered live options in the 
context. .. (Stalnaker 1972: 388) 
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This \,ould mean that there is no point in uttering (23 J. But is that enough to make 
it ungrammatical? After all, we all are guilt)' of making useless utterances every 
now and then without therefore being classified as incompetent speakers of 
English. The argument in the case of (23) would have to be that it is structurally 
pointless. in some sense of 'structurally'. The issue is a vexing one and recurs 
frequently in semantic accounts of ungramrnaticality. lO In the absence of a better 
account for the illformedness of (2,) I will rest my case for now. 
3.3 Even If 
What's wrong with (25)? According to our semantics. (25) will have the 
implieature in (2o). 
(25) 	 *Even if anyone objects I will talk to him. 
(26) 	 3,~meone objects: all(Cnsomeone objects.I talk to the objector) 
<p all(CnXJ talk to the objector) 
This implicature is nonsensical. The set of relevant contrasts to anyone· s 
objecting will presumably be made up of alternative situations in which no one 
objects. None of those can be more likely to be such that I will talk to the Ofll' who 
objects than the ones in which someone actually does object. Again, the E-type 
pronoun already presupposes that all the situations considered contain an objector. 
hence a set of contrasting situations where no one objects will be useless. And 
again. we have to resort to vigorous hand-waving to get from this built-in 
pragmatic- anomaly to the ungrammaticality of (26). 
4. Focus-lnduct>d Constraint,; on Domains 
We will now have to deal with the data in (20). which show that if material in the 
conditional other than the indefinite is focussed the indefirnte can serve as the 
antecedent for a donkey pronoun in the matrix. How come? 
(20) 	 a. { ~;;~t~f} a farmer is RICH. he shouldn't heat his donkeys. 
h {Only if } 1· . RI .. H h Id h b h. k· If and only if a armer 1s C . s uu c eat 1s don cys. 
c. {~~!~sff} you {-7;;N} a donkey, you shouldn't beat it. 
{ Only if } {*pwn ! . . d. If and only if you "'OWN Ja donkey. should you beat 11. 
lOA pn•m,ncnt example is Barn isc & C<X,per's ( l'li-:1 i attempt of reducing the definiteness cffc<:< 
in existenual sentences to a presupposition clash, d. the criticism in Keenan t 1987). Similarly., on 
Finlcl ( 199:!) motirntes the co-occurrence restricuons nf cxccpu, e operators b; the ob,en ation 
that the ungrammatkal wllocatipns would automat1cally result in cnntraJ1ct10ns. See Ladusa\\ 
I l98f,) fnr some genernl discussmn of 'semantll' flltenng· 
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4.1 Unless 
Here's my story. What is the difference between the cases where donkey anaphora 
is unavailable and those where it is o.k.? Let us meditate on the specific contrast 
in (27). 
(27) Unless you {i;N /a donkey. you shouldn"t beat it. 
Why should stress on the verb make it possible that the object is available as an 
antecedent for a donkey pronoun? After all. unle.1s will still remove all the 
situations where you own a donkey. Where is the donkey that it refers back to? 
The intuition I will develop is that the focus on the verb signals that we are 
contemplating alternative relations between you and a donkey, and we are saying 
that none of those except the ones that are owning relations entitle you to beating 
it. The donkey will exist in all the situations considered. Hence the donkey 
pronoun is licit. 
Assume that. following Rooth ( I 985 etc.). in the interpretation of you OIVN a 
Jonker, we compute not only the ordinary denotation Uyou own a donkey U0 • but 
also the set of relevant contrasts to the ordinary denotation. call it OWill OIi'!\' a 
donkey UP. In terms of our earlier notation this "ill tum out to be the set {X: x~ 
,. UWill own ll Jonker n°}. 
What use is this set? Well. it seems to be the set of alternatives being talked 
about. A natural move now would be to say that the first argument C of the 
adverbial quantifier modified by the un/n.1-conditional is identified with or 
restricted to this set of alternatives. The proposal is seen in (28). 
(28) unless ORO 0 • Q IC I IM I= Q I C - ff RO O I IM I 
Focus-induced constraint: C ~ DR II P 
If the donkey is supposed to exist in every situation in ORD P. we have to be 
very careful about what to admit into the set of relevant contrasts to the owning-
relation. If we consider all possible binary relation between a person and a donkey 
there will be lots and lots of those and in particular many that do not entail the 
existence of the donkey. For example. this is a binary relation between me and a 
donkey: "living in the same century as an artist who painted a picture of". This 
problem is discussed in by Rooth ( 1991 ). For our stock example. that means that 
the domain of quantification will have to be all those situations that contain you 
standing in an owning-type relation (borrowing/leasing/renting/etc.) to a donkey. 
From now on. I will assume that ORD P is the set of relevant contrasts. however 
that is computed. 
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4.2 Only Ifand Even If 
The explanation of the contrasts in (29) runs along the same lines. 
(29) a. Only if you {7;~} a donkey, should you beat it. 
b. Even if you {lo~} a donkey, you shouldn't beat it. 
The evoked set of alternative situations to your owning a donkey will be 
comprised solely of situations where there is in fact a donkey that 1s 
owned/borrowed/leased. Hence, the E-type pronoun it will succesfully refer. 
4.3 A Mystery: Narrow CN-Focus 
Consider the contrast in (30), which should be read under narrow focus on the 
common noun donkey as indicated by the context sentence. 
(30) Farmers around here in New England are pretty nice to their pack animals. 
a. Only if a farmer owns a DON key does he beat it. 
b. Even if a farmer owns a DON key he doesn't beat it. 
c. ?'!Unless a farmer owns a DONkey he doesn't beat it. 
d. Only if it's a DONkey that a farmer owns does he beat it. 
e. Even if it's a D0Nkey that a farmer owns he doesn"t beat it. 
f. '·'Unless it's a DONkey that a farmer owns he doesn't beat it. 
Under the intended interpretation the focus on the common noun should evoke a 
contrast set of pack animals. The E-type pronoun should be able to refer to the 
pack animal that a farmer owns. It seems that this is indeed available with the only 
if- and even if-conditionals. But something still obstructs the successful pack 
animal-anaphora with unless-clauses. This is a mystery to me. 
4.4 Focus and If-Conditionals: The Proportion Problem 
Does the semantics of if have to be focus-conscious. too? There are suggestions in 
the literature that say yes. The question arises in the context of the so-called 
'proportion problem', which is a serious problem for the unselective binding 
approach to donkey anaphora. The crucial observation is that there is a prominent 
reading of (31) that does not quantify over farmer-donkey pairs but over donkey-
owning farmers. The empirical test consists in judging whether a very rich farmer 
owning hundreds of donkeys would tip the balance. The consensus is that there is 
a reading where it doesn't matter how many donkeys a farmer owns: we are just 
quantifying over donkey-owners. 
(31) If a farmer owns a donkey, he is happy. 
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The problem is of course that any unselective approach would have the higher 
operator bind both indefinites in the restrictive if-clause. thus predicting that 01) 
is counting farmer-donkey pairs. A way of selecting the correct quantifiees is 
needed. 
There are quite a variety of ideas on the market on how to deal with this 
selection problem. KratLer ( 1989a) and Diesing ( !990) suggest that only 
indefinites that can be scrambled outside the VI' can be captured. 11 Chierchia 
( 199 I) appeals to a process of topic-selection. so far unreduced to other 
mechanisms. All of these bear a close relation to focus phenomena. Let me sketch 
how a focus sensitive semantic rule for conditionals would fare with the 
proportion problem. I' 
Within a situation based approach, the task boils down to finding a 
principled way of deriving the set of situations specified in (32). from Heim 
( I ()(X)J_ as the domain of quantification. 
(32) 	 { s: 3xl x is a farmer in s & 
3s'is ss' & 3yly is a donkey Ills' & x owns yin s'IIJ} 
The minimal situations in the set of situations in U2) will contain a farmer and not 
much else. All of them will be extendablc into siwations containing 
donkeys that the former own,;. Any nf the farmers quantified o\er will therefore 
he donkey-owners. But the number of donkeys OWJH'd play, no role for the 
e\aluation of the quantified stalement. The desired farmer donkey asymmetry is 
achieved. Heim ( I99<)i derives U2J via syntactic manipulations at LF. Can we gel 
the same result by using the focus story'! 
Let's assume. maybe not too recklessly. thal there is focus 011 the verb 
phrase in the asymmetric reading of (3 I). U The input to the semantics therefore 
,\ ill be (33 ). 
(.B) lfa farmu !owns a donkey IF, he is happy. 
Try this on for size. The presupposition value for the complement of i/'will be all 
the situations containing ,1 farmer where the farmer has some property in the 
L'Oll trast class uf donk,~y ()\\ 11i ng. Now. I\ e cou Id Sil) that t Iii s set is pared d(m 11 
forthcr by 111aki11g sure tl1a1 all these situations me part of a situation where lhe 
farmer owns c1 donkey. This will weed oul all the tl\lll donkey ,n1ning farmers. 
Hut the domain or quantifi,·ation me still _just situatiuns 1\ith a farmer and some 
property. This will mean that the adverb will in fact quantify o\'cr farmers. The 
proposal in (3~1) is what we seem to need. Sentence (JI) under the asymmetric 
reading will bt· intcrprd!'d as in C~S). 
I I D1csrng onl~ applies lhc <.H:1,,.'nunt tu inJdrn11e... it\ tht' rnatl"I\, \\ hde Ki ...1t1er C\tCnlh the 
mccham..,m ;o t.;.1cklc the pn1porL1t1n problem.  
12At lhl.'.-, p1,1rnL. d vurup~tr1s,,11 \\ltli thl· rcL.1tcJ app1oach pHJf)l.>,nl in Kntla ( l•.Jl)~J 1s.; calleJ lu1  
hut cmnr1l \Cl [:ic t )tl{,,1{.'d.  
13 Thi~ a:-.•;urnpl1nn rH:r~h 11, hr 1n,est1ga1eJ 1n Jt·ta11 h~ !1~1~111t2 ,ll dtlltrent 'l'rb ,:la""-<'"- JIH.1 
d111crcnt rncu.., cl\\l~nmcn[, 
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(34) 	 if [R] 0 Q [Cl [M] = Q [ C n {s 13 s'(s' ~ s & s' E [R] 0 )}] (M( 
Focus-induced constraint: C ~ [ R] P 
(35) 	 "All of the minimal situations in the set of currently relevant situations in 
which there is a farmer with some property of the donkey-owning type and 
which are part of a situation in which there is a farmer who owns a donkey 
are part of a larger situation in which the farmer is happy." 
We have a problem. The unfocussed existential quantifier a farmer from the if-
clause will be interpreted twice, once in ff R) P and once in ff RD 0 , Note the 
double occurrence of "there is a farmer. .. " in the paraphrase in (35). There is no 
guarantee that we are talking about the same farmer. In effect, any farmer will be 
in the domain of quantification as long as there is one donkey-owning farmer in 
the world. How can we make sure that only donkey-owning farmers are 
considered? Heim had no problems with this, since in her LF-approach there was 
no second occurrence of the existential quantifier. Instead, there was a trace 
interpreted as a bound variable. The more purely semantic account that we are 
pursuing here has no such option. 
What we need is a relation between the farmer-situations quantified over 
and the farmer-donkey-owning situations that is stronger than the mere part-of 
relation. Within the machinery of situation semantics there is in fact such a 
stronger relation. Not only can we say that a proposition is true in a situation 
(sEp), but we can also construct a notion of a situation being a fact that makes a 
proposition true, which is somewhat stronger. Building on that notion we can then 
use a more selective part-of relation which does the right thing for our problem. 
Angelika Kratzer ( I 990, I 991) gives the definition in (36). 
(36) 	 Facts that make proposition:, true 
Ifs is any situation and p any proposition, then s is a fact that makes p true 
iff for alls' such thats' s sands' r!. p, there is ans" such thats' s s" s s, and 
s" is a minimal situation in which pis true. 
Essentially, this definition ensures that a fact that makes a proposition true does 
not contain any situation that doesn't contribute to the truth of the situation, it 
doesn't contain any irrelevant stuff. That is what we needed. The non-donkey-
owning farmers do not contribute to the truth of ''there is a farmer who owns a 
donkey". So they can be filtered out. The amended semantics for if is given in 
(37) and sentence (3 I) gets the paraphrase in (38). 
(37) 	 if[R] 0 Q [CJ [M] =Q ( C n {s 13 s'(s' ~ s & 
s' is a fact that makes ff RD O true)} I (Ml 
Focus-induced Constraint: C ~ ff R] P 
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(38) 	 ··All of the minimal situations in the set of currently relevant situations in 
which there is a farmer with some property of the donkey-owning type and 
which are part of a larger situation which is a fact that makes it true that 
there is a farmer who owns a donkey are part of another larger situation in 
which the farmer is happy:· 
We have now successfully mimicked Heim"s situation-based approach to the 
proportion problem in a way that uses focus-induced presupposition 
accommodation rather than LF-maneuvers_ 14 
4.5 Rack to ·unless· 
The focus-sensitive semantics for un/l'.1.1 formulated earlier in (28) did not make 
reference to the elaborate notion of a fact making a proposition true. Can we 
harmlessly incorporate this into the meaning of 111111'.1.1 in order to achieve a 
uniform schema for the interpretation of conditionals'! ls (39) adequate'' 
(39) 	 unless OR II O Q [(' I IM I Q I C - { s I 3 s'( s' "s & 
s' is a fact that makes ORO O true)} 11 MI 
At the moment, I can·t see anythmg wrong with (.NJ_ 
5. The Relation Between Focus and Scoping 
After having developed a fairly successful theory of how complex conditionals 
and donkey-anaphora interact, it is time to see what these facts tell us about the 
roots of semantic partition. 
5.1 Focus and rr>-Jnternal Scrambling 
The crucial innovation of my account is that focus-induced contrast sets are used 
to restrict the domain of quantification in such a way that donkey-anaphora is 
made possible_ Can this effect of making indefinites in complex conditionals 
available for donkey anaphora be achieved in a more syntactic way? 
Cicnnaro Chierchia ( 1991) proposes that only indefinites that arc topics are 
captured by adverbial quantifiers. That seems to be on the right track, see also 
Harbara Partee·s ( 1991) work on the connection between topic-focus articulation 
and quantification. We can see my proposal as an implementation of this general 
idea. But there could of course be more syntactic reflexes of topic-hood that may 
play a more primary role. Chierchia himself just takes topic-marking as a 
primitive in his system, deferring discussion. Let's do some of the required work. 
Molly Diesing ( 1990) and Angelika Kratzer ( 1989a) have devised a system 
which postulates an asymmetry between material inside the verb phrase and 
material higher than the verb phrase_ Since they close off the VP by an operation 
14Again, th1-., I" not the place tu cumpa,c the locus ha~cU approach lo the LX-approach. /\1...,o. \\ c 
\\JII h,nc lo ignore lor the moment the cnt,u,nis ol the \ltuat,on-ba,cJ approach put lornarJ m 
Ch1crch1a ( J l/91 I 
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of existential closure, only indefinites that find themselves outside the VP at the 
crucial level (LF) remain unscathed and can be captured by a higher quantifier. 
Maybe we can mentally associate the VP-material with the notion of focus and the 
higher material with topic-hood. 
Let us look at an example. 
(40) Unless you {lo~} a donkey, you shouldn't beat it. 
Assuming for the time being that we can establish a connection between focus on 
the verb and LF-scrambling of the object, the LFs for the sentences in (40) will 
look somehow like the ones in (41 ). 
(41) a. should [unless you 3x[VP own a donkeyxll [you not beat itx] 
b. shouldx [unless you a donkeyx [VP own x]] [you not beat itxl 
The unscrambled indefinite object in (41a) gets bound off by the VP Existential 
Closure and cannot be captured by the quantifier Jhould. In (41b), the object has 
scrambled and can get bound by the quantifier and the donkey pronoun is licensed 
too. 
Superficially, this may look right, but look closer. The indefinite is still 
inside the unless-clause. And unless has a distinctly negative meaning. However 
we want to express the meaning of unless in this framework (it would have to 
subtract tuples of variable length I guess), it seems that as long as the indefinites 
are buried inside the unless-clause they won't be able to restrict the quantifier. I 
think that the correct LF for the well-formed sentence in (40) should be as in (42). 
(42) shouldx [a donkeyx [unless you own x]] [you not beat itx] 
Very well, but how did the indefinite escape the unless-clause? Not by syntactic 
movement! Like other adverbial subordinators, unless creates a hefty barrier 
against syntactic movement as (43) demonstrates. 
(43) *Who will you call Kim if/when/unless/although/because you see t? 
It seems then that the cases of defocussed indefinites in complex 
conditionals presented here offer a strong argument that focus-induced restrictions 
of adverbial quantifiers cannot be reduced to syntactic processes. 
5.2 Deep Embeddings 
Angelika Kratzer pointed out to me a type of example that can be used to show 
that the focus-story I have told does need to be supplemented with a scoping 
mechanism of some sort. Consider the data in (44). 
75 
(44) a. Unless you are absolutely sure that you OWN a donkey, you 
shouldn't beat it. 
b. 	 Unless you know the person who OWNS a donkey. you shouldn't 
beat it. 
c. 	 Unless you are wondering whether you might BUY a donkey, you 
shouldn"t look it in the mouth. 
Here. the set of relevant alternatives clearly won't be such that all of them 
guarantee the existence of a donkey. For example, the set of situations where you 
are absolutely sure that you own a donkey or are borrowing a donkey or are 
leasing a donkey does not invariably entail the existence of such a donkey. You 
may be mistaken. 
It seems to me that to be grammatical the sentences in (AK) have to be read 
with a de re-interpretation of the donkey. The most popular account for de re-
readings is of course based on scoping. What we have to do then is to scope the 
indefinite u donkey to right under unless. This should be possible since the islands 
here are of the weak sort. Compare the essentially grammatical examples of 
extraction out of these contexts in (45). 
(45) a. 'This is a donkey that I'm absolutely sure that I own. 
b. 'This is a donkey that I know the person who owns. 
c. 'This is a donkey that I'm wondering whether I might buy. 
Now. quite possibly the scoping is not available on the first parse of the 
sentences in (44). We could perhaps say that it is the existence presupposition of 
the E-type pronoun that triggers the scoping. 
It seems then that the data in (44) offer a strong argument that the effect of 
syntactic scoping on the domain selection of adverbial quantifiers cannot be 
entirely reduced to focus phenomena. Taken together, the results presented here 
argue for a peaceful co-existence of the focus effects and the syntactic 
mechanisms. Neither can be entirely reduced to the other. 
Left open is the plausible conception that in the unmarked case the two 
phenomena are highly correlated. Defocussing an item is then correlated with it 
taking a syntactic position outside of the typical focus domain. the VP. This whole 
area is under active investigation and promises fruitful results for the syntax and 
semantics of quantification. 
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